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Abstract: This article argues that the debate concerning the nature of the corporation is
not finished and nor a mere intellectual exercise for interested legal academics. The
current model of the corporation as an economic entity—the firm—has a number of
imbedded value assumptions. Given the common territory between corporate law and
economics, some scholars have come to identify the two as equal partners striving for the
same ends. This is a serious error which has had and continues to have significant
negative consequences for both the economic situation of the majority and justice in
society. These value assumptions are being seriously brought into question in light of
developing economic experience and analysis. In light of experience, the values are far
from being universally accepted. Furthermore, they do not promote a just society.
Models of the corporation are fundamental to the debate because models are both
descriptive and prescriptive. For society to develop on just lines, the debate of the
fundamental values needs to be brought into the open and brought under closer scrutiny.
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THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE MODELS: ECONOMIC AND
JURISPRUDENTIAL VALUES AND THE FUTURE OF CORPORATE LAW

Every school of thought is like a man who has talked to himself for a hundred
years and is delighted with his own mind, however stupid it may be.

J.W. Goethe, 1817, Principles of Natural Science

1

INTRODUCTION

Corporate law scholar, D. Millon, in his article “The Ambiguous Significance of
Corporate Personhood”1 argues that much of the current debate among scholars
concerning the correct or most appropriate model of the corporation is misguided. He
argues that the debate is misguided because it contributes little to the understanding of the
actual use and operation of the corporation in today’s economy. Further, it does not jibe
with current jurisprudence which seems to have settled on a particular efficiency based
model.2 Hence, to the extent that the purpose of having the correct model for the
corporation is understanding actual use and operation of the corporation, he may be
correct.

One approach to the corporate model debate includes a review of the history of the
corporation, noting its privileged and public beginnings, the shift to the registration and

1

D. Millon, “The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood”, Washington and Lee Public Law and
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-6, Jan., 2001.
2
See comment of ,William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 Wash. & Lee L.
Rev. 1395, 1399 (1993).
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limited liability corporations followed by the separation of management and
shareholders.3 Focusing on such things as legal fictions and nineteenth century legal
developments, however, hardly informs or guides issues of the twenty first century.
Another approach to the debate, largely informed by political views, is the debate
between contractarian and progressive corporate law scholars.4

An effort to unravel the twisted jurisprudence is unlikely to be fruitful either, as the
historical model debate demonstrates. The reality is that the corporation is a firm—a
group of people organized to raise funds and operate a profitable business.5

These views, however, fail to go far enough into the issue. The issue is not “what is the
corporation”? For to describe what is is not the same as to say what should be. This
article commences with an examination of what is, and in particular, the model it is based
on. It will then examine the values and assumptions underlying the model, and see how it
has met its values or objectives. It will then examine its short-comings. Next it will turn
to the future and see where corporations are going, asking if our model will be adequate
to deal with those additional challenges. Finally we will propose a few modifications that
a new model should perhaps include.

3

This approach seems to be more common among British and Australian corporate law scholars. See for
examples, J. Dine, The Governance of Corporate Groups, (2000), S. Bottomley, “From Contractualism to
Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate Governance” (1997) Sydney LR at p. 277, J. Farrar,
“Frankenstein Incorporated or Fool’s Parliament? Revisiting the Concept of the Corporation in Corporate
Governance” (1998) 10 Bond LR at p. 161
4
See P. Cox “The Public, The Private and The Corporation,” (1997) 80 Marq. L. Rev. 391and S.
Bainbridge , “Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of Progressive Corporate
Law Scholarship.” 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856
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2

ECONOMICS: THE DISCIPLINE

Over the course of its brief history, economics has developed into a social science dealing
with decision making and in particular, with predicting behaviour. It is essentially the
science developed to analyze the utility of resources is economics, or perhaps more
properly, the science of allocation under conditions of scarcity.6 Although American
economics has by and large failed to address the epistemological problems inherent to all
science,7 it has provided valuable insight into and support for decisions concerning
creating a better society.

Economists generally assume a utilitarian approach,8 using theoretical beings in
developing models about the way the world works.9 It is a long-standing and famous
criticism of economics that its modeling and theory are quite removed from experience.10
As Nobel Laureate in economics, Ronald Coase, observed:

5

R. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” 4 Economia (1937) (NS) 386.
Lionel Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, (1932).
7
The dearth of postmodern criticism of economics and general lack of requisite reflection on the
foundations of the discipline are nearly incredible to humanists. For an encouraging and interesting
tentative step in this direction, see Oxford economist, John Kay’s musings “Postmodernism, Rationality
Management” 7 March, 2001 Financial Times. Europeans have addressed these issues in more depth,
particularly in the philosophy of science debate running from Karl Popper, to Thomas Kuhn, and on to
Lakatos.
8
Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law, 1962, Yale, p. 16, and see Posner’s discussion comparing economics
and utilitarianism in R. Posner, The Economics of Justice, 2nd ed. (1983), pp. 48-60.
9
The rather extensive and at times overzealous use of assumptions in economics is a source of criticism
both within and outside of the profession. As Cooter and Ulen light-heartedly repeat the comment, “the
economist’s predict was correct but the economy went wrong.” In Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law
and economics. 2nd ed., (1997), p. ix.
10
See the interesting analysis of economists’ mudslinging about theory in U. Maki, “Against Posner against
Coase against theory.” (1998) 22 Cambridge Journal of Economics 587.
6
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Economics, over the years, has become more and more abstract and divorced
from events in the real world. Economist, by and large, do not study the workings
of the actual economics system. They theorize about it. As Ely Devons, an
English economist, once said at a meeting ‘If economists wished to study the
horse, they wouldn’t go and look at horses. They’d sit in their studies and say to
themselves, “What would I do if I were a horse?”’11

Methodologically, economics works by establishing a point of reference and then
adopting a value which it uses as a criterion for advocating or opposing a particular
allocation, or predicting a particular behaviour.12 Economics can be either normative or
positive.13 Normative economics includes a broad array of values, perspectives and
approaches to the evaluation and allocation of society’s resources. It includes the
ecological14 and social values which are less often considered as part of traditional
economic analysis, and is advocated and practiced by such noteworthy economists as
Amarta Sen,15 and Karl Polyani.16 Normative economics, as represented by Ronald
Coase17 as an example, evidences some humility, recognizing that economics is but one
of many approaches to addressing the problem
s of society, and in particular, the
economic problems of society.18 Coase, discussing economics’ movement into other

11

R. Coase, The Task of Society, quoted in H. de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, (2000) p. 15.
See B. Hsiung’s excellent analysis of economic method in “The Success of Law and Economics: A
Methodological Interpretation” (hereinafter, Success) pp. 7-10.
13
For a simplified version, see Sir Richard Ivor’s discussion on the difference between descriptive and
normative economics in law in his “Address to Inaugural Law and Economics Course” in the newsletter of
Law & Economics Association of New Zealand, Sept. 1997, p. 3. Economics is simply put, not well suited
to making these types of society shaping judgments. B. Hsiung’s “A Methodological Comparison of
Ronald Coase and Gary Becker” (2001) American Law and Econ Rev. 186 (hereinafter Methodological) at
14
See for example, R. Costanza, What is ecological economics? (1989) Ecological Economics 1(1): 1-7
and M. Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth: Philosophy, Law, and the Environment. (1988).
15
A. Sen, On Ethics and Economics (1987)
16
K. Polyani, The Great Transformation, (1944).
17
R. Coase, “Economics and Contiguous Disciplines” (1978) 7 J. of Legal St., 201-211 at 206-207.
18
Ibid and discussed and explained in Hsiung, Methodological, op cit, n.13, p. 188-189
12

Importance of Corporate Models
Final Ed.

7

disciplines, offered: “it would perhaps be more plausible to argue that economists are
looking for fields in which they can have some success.”19

Positive economics was a reaction against some of the more philosophically minded
economists of the last century. Rather than focusing on theory, the positivists were
concerned about what they could find in reality. One branch of this school developed the
popular neo-classical approach to economics. Neo-classical economists claimed to be
doing value free scientific inquiry and hence were not to be bound or judged by the
philosophical mores or concerns of other economists. We will turn to examine the value
free science claim later in this paper. For now, we will concentrate on neo-classical
economics.

Neo-classical economics, contrary to their initial position, has moved a step beyond than
positive economics by developing normative recommendations about how society should
be organized and how resources should be allocated to meet those objectives.20 It starts
with the assumptions that all human behaviour as exclusively self-interested—i.e.
humans as no more than “rational utility maximizers”21—and that all interaction as
efficiency driven—i.e. market driven to find the lowest monetary cost for all goods and
services. Indeed, Chicago economist Gary Becker states, “I am saying that the economic
approach provides a valuable unified framework for understanding all human
19

R. Coase, “Economics and Contiguous Disciplines,” (1978) 7 J. Legal Studies 201 cited in B. Hsiung,
Methodological, op cit, n. 13, p. 187, n. 2.
20
For discussion of positive economics, see M. Friedman, “Positive Economics”, in The Philosophy of
Economics, D. Hausman, ed (1990). pp 210-244.
21
The famous homo economicus is what I am referring to. For an economist’s criticism of this model of
human behaviour see Thaler, R. “Homo Economicus,” (2000) Journal of Economic Perspectives , Volume
14, Number 1, 133-141.
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behaviour.”22 Neo-classical economics, perhaps most commonly associated with the
New Chicago School after the 1960’s23 looks at the increase in wealth as the ultimate
objective of social organization.24 Where an action results in increased total wealth, the
transaction should be transacted, regardless of the desires of the parties.25

The New Chicago School commonly uses Kaldor-Hicksian efficiency as the normativestandard to evaluate economic “institutions”. This is a normative form of economics
whereby a dollars worth of value is the same across all persons. At this point, of course,
economists are no longer engaged in positive economics; rather, they are implicitly
validating the existing distribution of wealth and obviously, where this is the agenda, they
will oppose any attempt at reallocation or “rent-seeking and rent-keeping.” What makes
this argument a difficult one to engage is that in practice normative and positive
economics get conflated, and particularly so by neo-classical economists who claim to be
doing value-free science.26 In the name of efficiency, following Kaldor-Hicks, they
advocate that where an action results in increased total wealth, the transaction should be
transacted, regardless of the desires of the parties.27 This takes the form of a rule for the

22

G. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behaviour, (1976), p. 14. Although not all Economists
agree with Becker in this respect, most would agree that one can explain much “social” and “political”
behavior by reference to the pursuit of one’s self-interest.
23
For a review of economic intellectual history, see Robert Heilbroner’s The Worldly Philosophers. For a
brief summary of the Chicago School, see New School of Social Research’s history of economics website:
http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/chicago.htm
24
See for example, Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks theorems. See also Posner’s discussion Econ of Just,
op cit, n., 8 pp. 88-119.
25
Kaldor-Hicks as applied in Calabresi and Malamed’s view of property law in , Property Rules, Liability
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, (1972) 85 Harvard L. Rev., 1089.
26
See for example, Pareto efficiency or Kaldor-Hicks theorems. See also Posner’s discussion Econ of Just,
op cit, n. 8, pp. 88-119. Concerning the conflation of positive and normative economics, see D. Hausen
and M. McPherson, “Taking Ethics Seriously: Economics and Contemporary Moral Philosophy,” (1993)
31 J. of Economic Literature, 671-731, 673.
27
Kaldor-Hicks as applied in Calabresi and Malamed’s op cit, n. 25.
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allocation of property-rights discussed elsewhere in the law and economics literature.28
With the existence of transaction costs for their redistribution, the right should be
assigned to the party that values it most initially.

If we return to Hsiung’s methodological discussion, we recognize a dramatic difference
between the two approaches. Hsiung pointed out the central role of value selection—
referred to by Posner as “frame of reference”29—in determining the nature of the
economic project. Whereas most normative and positivist economists are open to
alternative values, neo-classicists have selected their one value and closed the door to
other values. Selecting a value and developing knowledge has moved from being mere
descriptive, normative economics, to positivist economics. This selection and total
rejection of alternative values by the neo-classical economists is highly inappropriate and
amounts to dishonesty in the academy. As noted economist Robert Heilbroner observes:
“what is essential, then, is to become aware of one’s socio-political values, not to pretend
they do not exist.”30 He goes on to note: “economics, in its ‘purest’ form is intrinsically
and inescapably ideological.”31

The discipline most suited to developing value judgments can hardly be mathematically
focused economics. Rather, those types of judgments are properly the province of
philosophers. Although earlier in its history economics was affiliated with philosophy

28

Ibid.
Noted and discussed in Hsiung, Success, op cit, n. 12 p. 10, n. 33.
30
R. Hielbroner, “Vision and Analysis in the History of Economic Thought” in Pier Porta et al, eds. (2001)
Knowledge, Social Institutions and Division of Labour. Pp. 54-63, at p. 61.
31
Ibid, at p. 63.
29
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and the humanities, it abandoned that approach in favour of a scientific methodology.32
If economists wish to continue to make value decisions within the academy, they must
abandon their claim to be conducting scientific study and producing scientific knowledge.
Undoubtedly, the philosophers would be delighted to further participants in their
engaging debates.

Nevertheless, if we examine neo-classical economics from a methodological perspective,
we find that the neo-classicist economists have selected efficiency as the primary value of
society.33 All other values, including justice, mercy, and happiness come second, if at
all.34 Once having made this value judgment, further discussions of right and wrong,
moral or immoral are ignored or dismissed as meaningless.35 While appropriate for a
science to dismiss such discussion, at least in some views36 it is questionable
methodologically to deny or stifle the a priori value debate in science, particularly where
the selection of values is at the foundation of the method and therefore determinative of
outcomes.37 It is generally recognized, however, that efficiency is not an ultimate end. It
is an immediate end. So, for example, the value of efficiency in killing a group of people
targeted for execution depends on the perspective. From the perspective of the killers,

32

Heilbroner, op cit, n. 23.
Hsiung, Success, op cit, n. 12, p. 14, notes “For economists, using efficiency as the criterion of judgment
is almost beyond dispute.”
34
While scientists can hardly be faulted for not addressing such values, the issue of economic science,
which deals with such issues, is called into question as we shall see later. Posner has dealt with happiness
in his readable and thoughtful criticism of utilitarianism; however, his wealth maximization principle does
not address this issue any better—perhaps a criticism he himself recognized. See The Econ of Justice, p.
52.
35
See for example, R. Posner, “1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Problematics of Moral and
Legal Theory,” (1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1637.
36
The problem here is whether or not one accepts science as value-free.
37
This stronger view of the role of the researcher’s bias interestingly finds its roots in the natural sciences,
and particularly with the phenomenon of researcher observation creating the phenomena in subatomic
particle physics.
33
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efficiency is an important value. From the perspective of the victims, inefficiency is the
highest value. The value of efficiency, therefore, depends on the ends which it seeks to
achieve.

For neo-classical economists, such as Chicago’s Friedman quoted above, the ultimate
end—the increased monetary wealth in society38—is the sole, exclusive and ultimate
Good.39 Accordingly, all their prescriptions for social organization and order revolves
exclusively around increasing wealth (or at least utility) by increasing efficiency.40 Any
brake on efficiency is seen as wrong, erroneous, unscientific, and directing society down
the wrong path. It is “irrational.”41 If scientists were to use the language of ethics—
which they sometimes slip into—they would argue that inefficiency is an immoral, evil
waste of money. As such, economics tends to be limited to discussion of things that can
be monetized.42 While this limitation is insignificant in the discussion of economy, there
can hardly be anything more significant to a discussion of human life. Health, happiness,
family, friends and a sense of fulfillment—the most important things in life—simply are

38

Views clarified and argued by R. Posner, Econ of Just, op cit, n. 8.
See Posner’s chapter 3 of Econ of Just, op cit, n. 8, in which he sets out his theory of “wealth
maximization” and specifically deals with it in chapter 4 “The Ethical and Political Basis of Wealth
Maximization” as an ethical theory, in Posner, Econ of Just., op cit, n. 8, pp. 48-115 and in Malloy and
Posner in “Debate: Is Law and Economics Moral?” 24 Val. U. L Rev. 147. Interestingly, in his 1997
Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures he denies completely having ethical concerns. His most distinguished
opponent, R. Dworkin, challenges the views expressed in the Holmes Lectures in R. Dworkin, “Darwin’s
New Bulldog,” (1998) 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1718.
40
To argue the opposite—that a society should be organized around creating inefficiency—fails to grasp
the point of the discussion. The issue is not whether efficiency is an important value. Rather, the concern
is whether is should be the sole or ultimate value or organizing principle of a society.
41
Before concluding that it is “irrational”, however, one must consider the nature of rationality in
economics, and in particular bounded rationality. Given the limited and imperfect character of the
information we possess and the developing understanding of fuzzy concepts and chaos theory, conclusions
about “irrationality” should carry a significant caveat—namely, that a choice or decision may be
“irrational” but only so in the model being used.
42
See discussion of money and monetary system in H. de Soto, The Mystery of Capital, (2000) NY, Basic
Books, pp. 43-44, 63.
39
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not subject to monetization.43 Neo-classical positive economics tends to lack the
humility of normative economics and is subject to the criticism of “economic
imperialism.”44

Thus, while efficiency is clearly an important value,45 it can hardly be the fundamental or
organizing value or principle of a society.46 In Sir Richard Ivor’s understatement: “A
society where everyone is intent on maximizing their own wealth has its limitations.”47
Efficiency may require killing off the excess humans or enslaving some other humans.48

43

Both Posner and Becker recognize the difficulty and overriding importance of non-monetized events and
values. They have taken different approaches in dealing with them. Posner has acknowledge them, but
largely been silent (see Econ of Justice, p. 64). Becker, by way of contrast, has applied his method even to
such thorny issues as marriage, family and free time. The Economic Approach to Human Behavior,
(1976).
44
R. Swedberg, Economics and Sociology. In addition, for a criticism of the economic analysis of law, see,
for instance, R. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value? 9 J. Legal Stud. 191 (1980); R. Malloy, Law and Economics:
A Comparative Approach to Theory and Practice (1990); R. Epstein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past
and Cloudy Future, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1167 (1997); and N. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The
Philosophical Critique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1197 (1997). As observed
by economist, Abba Lerner, “Economics has gained the title of queen of the social science by choosing
solved political problems as its domain.” “The Economics and Politics of Consumer Soverignty,” 62(2)
American Economics Review, (1972), 258-266, cited in S. Bowles ad H. Gintis, “Revenge of Homo
Economicus: Contested Exchange and the Revival of Political Economy.” 7(1) J. of Econ. Perspectives,
83-102, (1993) p. 86.
45
Hsiung observes that “For economists, using efficiency as the criterion of judgment is almost beyond
dispute, but for some legal scholars at least, they find it difficult to accept the idea of efficiency as applied
to studying legal studies.” Success, op cit, n. 12, p. 14.
46
Societies have been organized around religion, social class, social relationships, artistic ability, warriors’
power etc. It is important to recognize that each of these societies considered itself to be “the best, most
advanced etc.”. This recognition must bring a bit of humility to our evaluation of our economically driven
society. See F. Fukuyama’s The End of History and The Last Man, and particularly his concluding chapter.
47
“Address to Inaugural” op cit, n. 13, p. 3. Posner would argue not only that it is possible, but that society
in fact does organize itself and its laws on the basis of efficiency. See his chapters “A Theory of Primitive
Society” and “The Economic Theory of Primitive Law” in Economics of Justice, pp. 146-173 and 174-206
respectively.
48
Posner recognizes this as a valid criticism of traditional utilitarian based economics in Econ of Just, n. 8,
p. 54. While his theory successfully dodges this problem with utilitarianism, its error is equally egregious
if not more pernicious in restricting all discussion and allocation of the world’s resources to those with the
sufficient economic resources to acquire them. Posner argues that he and his fellow court of appeal judges
are just average, ordinary citizens. It is hard to imagine how a person who could afford a minimum of
seven years education, practice law for the requisite period earning an average lawyer’s salary, and have
the political connections and prestige to be appointed appeal court judges are to be considered simply the
average person. For further discussion and a more fundamental criticism of Posner’s view see those raised
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Even neo-classicist Friedman acknowledges efficiency cannot be the driving force of
society. He wrote, “I would favor a free society even if it were less productive than some
alternative—say a slave society… because my basic value is freedom itself.”49
Nevertheless, neo-classical economists ignore other just such values, the values usually
considered in economics, namely, freedom, security, justice and welfare.50

3

LAW AND ECONOMICS

The role of economics in legal analysis has blossomed since Coase’s critical 1960
contribution “The Problem of Social Cost,”51 for understandable reasons and with good
results.52 In fact, it has developed to the point that, as one scholar puts it: “economic
analysis in legal scholarship has become so de rigueur that even those who refuse to view
economics as the Holy Grail of knowledge are compelled to use economics in their
scholarship.”53 Economics, adopted by law and economics scholars, tends to be neoclassical economics with its driving value, efficiency.54 These neo-classical positive

by N. Siegel, “Sen and the Hart of Jurisprudence: A Critique of the Economic Analysis of Judicial
Behavior,” (2000) 87 Calif. L. Rev. 1581.
49
M. Friedman, “Free Markets and Free Speech,” 10 Harvard J. Law & Pub. Pol’y 1 (1987). But to be
consistent, should not Friedman then be developing an economics based on freedom as the ultimate value
instead of efficiency?
50
Interestingly, one of the supposed champions of neo-classical economists, von Mises considered these
values as important and important in economic analysis. His concerns for these values tend to be
completely missed by his later admirers who take him to be a neo-liberal, neo-conservative economist
without social concern. The issues related to social costs were first brought up by Arthur Cecil Pigou
which he addressed as externalities.
51
R. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” (1960) 111 Journal of Law of Economics, 1.
52
For an enlightening discussion of this phenomenon, see B. Hsiung, Success, op cit, n. 12.
53
A. Seita, “Common Myths in the Economic Analysis of Law,” (1989) B.Y.U. L. Rev. 993, 995-997.
54
See for a general discussion of the development of economics in expending beyond the Economics
Department, and particularly, into law, B. Hsiung, Success, op cit n. 12. A review of the general law and
economics literature leads one to the conclusion of the efficiency value. See, for example, some of the
criticisms of law and economics raised by Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Market Economy: Reinterpreting
the Values of Law and Economy, (2001) Cambridge University Press. For a remarkably insightful and
thorough article concerning the a priori philosophical and political values and commitments of scholars and
relating them to corporate law, see Cox, op cit n. 4.
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economists of law and economics scholarship posit one form of efficiency, wealth
maximization, as the fundamental principle of social organization.55

Nevertheless this meeting of law and very limited, outdated56 neo-classical positive
economics57 is seen by some law and economics scholars, including no less a noteworthy
than Judge Posner,58 to be the ideal. In the view of those law and economics scholars,
law is the practical application or implementation of economic science and positive
55

The obsession with size in America, and particularly the idea that larger is better, is subject to many
criticisms. In this particular case, one cannot but help make the analogy of craniometry—the “science” of
brain size, founded by Paul Broca and Samuel Morton, and the “science” of wealth maximization where in
both instances bigger is “better” without a deep understanding what “better” really is. Craniometry
disappeared from the academy when it was realized and admitted that the evidence did not bear out the
hypothesis. One can only hope that the neo-classicists will have the integrity and graciousness to take note
of the evidence and follow that example.
56
See criticisms below concerning postmodernism and economics. Also, see Amartya Sen’s criticism of
the mechanistic method to economic analysis applied by contemporary economic theory which method he
sees as its “major deficiency.” In Ethics and Economics, (1987) p. 28.
57
The dearth of postmodern criticism of economics and general lack of requisite reflection on the
foundations of the discipline are nearly incredible to humanists. For an encouraging and interesting
tentative step in this direction, see Oxford economist, John Kay’s musings “Postmodernism, Rationality
Management” 7 March, 2001 Financial Times. See also R. Rossini Favretti “Interpretation and
Representation in the Discourse of Economics”, in P. Porta et al Knowledge, Social Institutions and the
Division of Labour (2001) Northampton, USA.
58
In much of the discussion that follows, I have taken Posner as the leading exemplar of law and
economics positivists. As will be evident, my disagreement with Posner about the correct location of
efficiency in the schemata of social values, leads to a number of criticisms of his positions. I have made an
effort not to fall into the error some scholars engaged in the debate who tend to argue with caricatures of
other positions rather than the real positions—an error identified by Cox Cox, n. 4, p. 401 Instead, I have
developed my criticisms from reading of Posner. In my reading of Posner’s work his views appear to have
become reified, more extreme and hence less nuanced over time. This trend makes it more difficult to
access and assess his later work and accordingly, most of the discussion below deals with his earlier work,
The Economics of Justice. My disagreement with Posner’s thinking and views should not be read as a
denigration of his clever and thoughtful consideration of the issues he touches. It is an intellectual
disagreement, with openness to competing values, much as he demonstrated in his earlier writings. At this
time in his career, although not value-free as none of us are, at least he appeared open to considering
alternative values, and it is in this spirit that I intend to offer this work and criticism. As Cunningham in his
thorough and critical analysis of Posner’s claims notes: “no single view or approach endorsed by all
proponents of economic analysis of the legal system, one viewpoint has remained the most prominent—that
of Judge Richard Posner.” W. Cunningham, “Testing Posner’s Strong Theory of Wealth Maximization.”
(1992) 81 Geo. L.J. 141. A legitimate argument could be made that Richard Epstein also of Chicago and
the most cited law and economics legal scholar should serve as exemplar.
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings02/most_cited.html My reason for focusing on Posner is
his long career, his efforts to balance and consider his thinking in light of his judicial practice, his
prominence in the Law and economics approach as just noted, and his efforts to communicate his views to
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economic policy. Law is but the tool for balancing the utility of various competing
claims and is best suited among society’s tools for making decisions about those
divisions, giving rise to and increasing society’s overall wealth. The general idea is to
bring scientific certainty, objectivity and impartiality to legal decisions.59 Law allocates
costs to where it is most efficient to do so60 regardless of where they can be most easily
absorbed. Corporate law, according to this view, as one spoke in the wheel of overall
society, is to be developed, interpreted and applied extrapolating along this line for the
exclusive purpose of increasing the economic output and wealth of society.

The economic role of the corporation tends to be the focus of analysis when one has
come to the conclusion that the corporation is an economic arrangement or organization,
and that corporate law is about increasing efficiency whether in the market, through such
things as disclosure legislation and securities, or in terms of the overall welfare of society
fulfilling the obligations of business.61 As argued famously Nobel Laureate in
Economics, Milton Friedman, the social good achieved by a corporation is producing a
profit. As he wrote in his controversial 1970 article:
the one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and
engage in activities designed to increase its profits…. Few trends could so
thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society as the acceptance
the non-academic universe make him an important voice for the positivist economics perspective among
the populous.
59
Robin Paul Malloy, Law and Market Economy: Reinterpreting the Values of Law and Economy, (2001)
Cambridge University Press, p. 5. Again, the idea of any science, let alone a social science, being certain,
objective or value-free, no longer has credibility. The foundational work criticizing economic’s pretensions
to being value-free science was done by R. Heilbroner. “Economics as ‘Value Free’ Science” 40 Soc. Res.
129 (1973). See discussion of postmodernism above Rossini Favretti, op cit n. 57. See also the discussion
of Critical Theory in D. Braybrooke, The Philosophy of Social Science (1987) and various Critical Legal
Studies theorists such as Kennedy.
60
Calabresi op cit, n. 25. This is the fundamental contribution of Coase in “The Problem of Social Costs”
op cit n. 51.
61
See for example M. Jensen, “Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate Objective Function.”
(Fall, 2001) 14 (3) Journal of Applied Corporate Finance .
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by corporate officials of a social responsibility other than to make as much money
for their stockholders as possible. 62

He argues that the fundamental freedom of society is properly equated with the
unadulterated, unmitigated pursuit of shareholder wealth.63

Unfortunately, the positive economics and law approach fails to notice a critical and very
fundamental difference between law and economics. As Joseph Singer puts it, drawing
from T.H. White’s character Balin “There is something important in humanity… I cannot
at present describe it.”64 Singer identifies the issue of fairness as one of law’s particular
contributions to society and suggests, among other things, that the answers proposed by
economists65 fail to meet some fundamental needs and desires of human nature.

4

LAW AND SOCIAL VALUES

Is arbitration of disputes with an eye to increasing of societal wealth the total or whole
and complete role of law? Such a view would hardly appeal to the average citizen.66
Indeed, from the perspective of the average citizen law that only adds and subtracts
wealth would be exceedingly strange. The courthouses are not called the House of
Economics and nor do the scales in the hands of the blindfolded Goddess of Justice,
62

“The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” NY Times Magazine, Sept. 13, 1970, at
32-33, 122, 124, 126.
63
A similar view is taken up by business scholars Michael Jensen and William Meckling in an alarmist,
radical, and in hindsight clearly incorrect, article “Between Freedom and Democracy” (Oct. 1977) The
Banker available at SSRN Electronic Library.
64
T. White, The Book of Merlyn, quoted in J. Singer, “Something Important in Humanity” (2002) 37 Harv.
C.R. C.L. L. Rev. 103.
65
Singer’s concern is with welfare economics, and in particular the work of L. Kaplow and S. Shavell
Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001). See Singer ibid.

Importance of Corporate Models
Final Ed.

17

Themis, contain gold coins or stacked dollar bills.67 Rather, the scales hold a human
heart. These figures are symbols of something different from economics and efficiency.
It is something we call justice. The difficulty of defining the term, although notorious,
need not force us to declare it meaningless and throw up our hands in defeat. Rather, it is
a vague term—a term that by definition is not wholly or readily definable.68

Law is concerned not only with economic efficiency, but with things we call retribution,
personal responsibility,69 fairness,70 and a just society.71 It is a discipline extending well
beyond economic concerns72 looking to aspirations for individual human beings as well
as for society as a whole. Its framework is not and cannot be limited to maximizing
wealth transactions. As Sir Richard Ivor notes: “there are always policy trade-offs
between efficiency, fairness and other individual and community values” with which law
must concern itself.73 In particular, law cannot be limited to a discussion of how to
organize and protect those with wealth.74

66

Both law and economics escape the grasp of the average citizen. Law’s highly technical reasoning is
simply beyond most people’s interest or ability, as Posner has noted, and economic analysis is either
objectionable or in some models too technical, as Hsiung has noted, Success, op cit, n. 12.
67
Traditional representations of Themis have a human heart in the balance.
68
On the growing recognition of importance of vagueness in science and mathematics, see the R. Sorenson,
“Vagueness” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall Edition 2001) Edward N. Zalta (ed)
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall1999/entries/russell/
69
The role of personal responsibility in the development of the human personality is central to much
philosophy, from the idea of individual responsibility in Aristotle’s virtue ethics to the Existentialists’ angst
and personal quest for meaning, as well as psychology including such thinkers as Karl Rogers and
Abraham Maslow.
70
Which includes of course, issues of distribution of resources, an activity greatly assisted by economic
analysis.
71
As Rawls observes, “A theory however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue;
likewise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if
they are unjust.” Theory of Justice, p. 1.
72
See T. Ulen, “Firmly Grounded: Economics in the Future of the Law” (1997) 3 Wis. L. Rev. 433 at p.
436.
73
“Address to Inaugural” op cit n 47, p. 1.
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Some readers may object that this article is not dealing with real law and economics
scholars but a mere caricature.75 Consider, however, Posner’s explanation of value: “The
most important thing to bear in mind about the concept of value is that it is based on what
people are willing to pay for something rather than on the happiness they would derive
from having it.”76 He goes on to explain: “The wealth of society is the aggregate
satisfaction of those preferences (the only ones that have ethical weight in a system of
wealth maximization) that are backed up by money.”77 Posner’s dismissal of those
people without resources as not valuing goods is difficult to understand and morally
unacceptable even by the society he purports to represent. Recent pharmaceutical
companies’ decision to supply HIV drugs at low cost because of public pressure suggests
that maximizing social wealth is not a sufficient or acceptable organizing principal or
value to many Americans.78

Does Posner truly expect people to believe that a starving person with no money places
less value (in any recognizable sense of the word) on a loaf of bread than a wealthy
person who happens to buy a loaf to feed the ducks?79 With a swipe of the pen Posner
and some law and economics scholars have wiped off the concerns of 5.9 billion people

74

See Critical Legal Studies analysis of law as found, for example,
See criticism noted by Cox, op cit, n 4, (n. 47 mentions caricature)
76
Posner, The Econ of Justice, p. 60. Curiously, this explanation of wealth ignores the economic principle
established by Daniel Bernoulli concerning the marginal utility of money. That principle is that the value
of each additional dollar is less than the one prior.
77
Posner, the Econ of Justice, p. 61
78
The drug industry escaped this fate when in 1995 it stopped producing eflornithine, the cure for sleeping
sickness, because of the lack of public awareness of sleeping sickness and because it does not strike people
in Northern climates. It is estimated that the drug would save the 66,000 people who die of it annually.
Production of the drug was restarted when pharmaceutical companies were able to commercialize its hari
loss side-effects.
79
Dworkin’s criticism of Posner, noted in Econ of Just.
75
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because they lack the dollars necessary to purchase resources.80 Oddly, if one were to
consider the issue from a broader perspective, these people have all the same rights,
including property rights in the environment to such things as clean air and water that
provide an economic contribution of more than $35 trillion81 to the world’s productive
output of which America is a notoriously disproportionate non-paying (non-valuing, or
perhaps, thief) over-consumer but nonetheless law and economics scholars dismiss.

Law recognizes that human nature is not only self-interested nor wealth driven in a way
that positive economics does not.82 For example, one need look no further than the Steve
Martin character in the movie The Jerk. In that movie, Martin plays a character who
became fabulously wealthy as a result of a quirky invention. In the course of the movie,
the wealthy Martin marries, and later, as he looses his fortune, finds himself in a divorce.
As he stumbles out of the mansion weeping, he grabs a few items that have meaning or
“wealth” for him. He bawls; “All I want is this ashtray, my blanket and a pair of pants.”
The money involved simply does not interest him.

80

Estimates of the world’s population are 6.5 billion, of whom 10% live a “developed” lifestyle—i.e. have
the income necessary to support excess consumption.

81

Figure from world renowned scientist and ecologist, David Suzuki, in “Suzuki offers 10 steps to save the
planet” R. Cairney (January 10, 2003 ) Express News, University of Alberta.
http://www.expressnews.ualberta.ca/expressnews/articles/news.cfm?p_ID=3646&s=a R. Constanza offers a
range of $16 trillion to $54 trillion. et al., The Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural
Capital, 387 NATURE 253 (1997) at 259 cited in D. Kysar, Sustainability, Distribution, and the
Macroeconomic Analysis of Law (2001) 43 B.C. L. Rev 1, at 40.
82
Economics is not the “Imperial Science.” Although it examines various aspects of human behaviour, it is
not all determinative nor can it be. Law and economics tends to use only one economic model of humans.
These humans are singly motivated: they act only as “rational self-interested maximisers.” Obviously, this
model tends to be excessively reductionist. Exacerbating the issue is its dogmatic application over what is
likely too wide a scope. See B. Hsuing “The Success of Law and Economics: A Methodological
Interpretation”, available at Law & Economics Association of New Zealand website,
http://www.leanz.org.nz/SITE_Default/SITE_papers/default.asp Other models which include a much
broader approach to human behaviour and society, such as that of Amarta Sen, are simply not addressed.
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The positive economist has difficulty explaining this action. The lawyer acting for
Martin, in order to avoid a negligence claim later would have to advise him to consider
more carefully his economic rights. Nevertheless, should Martin the client persist in this
view, the lawyer should not substitute her view of justice, fairness or value for that of the
client. And the law must and does take account of these various value systems.
Economics, at least as utilized by law and economics, cannot.83 As Hart has famously
said, “law, however, is too important a thing to be left to lawyers,”84 and Rorty the same
concerning philosophers,85 it is undoubtedly true the underlying value judgments required
in economics are too important to be left to the economists.

5

JURISPRUDENCE AND CORPORATE LAW

Bringing our discussion back to the corporation then, we can see that the economic
analysis of the corporation does not take into account all of law’s separate objectives such
as fairness and justice. Further it fails to include plurality of values. Even a modest
review of current corporate law objectives in the United States suggests that a plurality of
values forms the basis. Furthermore, these values are not at all in coincidence with one
another: They conflict as they represent different values in the corporation, society and
competing policies. Millon, for example, argues that corporate law has at least four
norms. He suggests that it should: (1) promote stable relations between certain nonshareholder constituencies and the corporation, (2) adjust the gains between shareholders

83

For a discussion of Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, see T. Ulen, Rational Choice and the
Economic Analysis of Law, (1994) 19 L. & Soc. Inquiry 487.
84
H.L.A. Hart, “Bentham on Legal Rights,” in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (2nd Series) A. B. Simpson
ed. (1973) reprinted in D. Lyons ed., Rights, (1979), p. 146.
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and non-shareholders, (3) address the fairness in allocation of transaction costs, and (4)
look for ways to include in decision making those most directly effected by such
decisions.86

Corporate law scholar Eric Orts observes the conflicting values in corporate law itself.
He notes, for example, the divided economic object: profit vs. wealth, short vs. long term,
central management vs. dispersed capital providers, capital accumulation, protection of
investors, and the protection of other interests.87 He offers following the law as an
objective in itself described as “modest idealism.”88 Orts even identifies the ethical
dimension of corporate law that allows for the non-economic considerations of ethics and
justice seen in such instruments as anti-takeover legislation.89 Following a remarkable
and interesting analysis of corporate legal theory Orts observes:
policies underlying corporate law cannot be reduced to a uni-dimensional value,
such as the economic objective of ‘maximizing shareholders' wealth’ or even,
more generally, ‘economic efficiency.’90

To narrowly limit discussion and consideration of corporate law to matters of economy
and more specifically therefore is either an error or a blatant political choice.91 If it is a
political choice, that choice must be put on the table and debated as such, instead of
attempting to hide it under the cloak of objective science often translated into orthodox
85

R. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (1999).
D. Millon, “New Directions In Corporate Law Communitarians, Contractarians, And The Crisis In
Corporate Law,” 50 Wash & Lee L.R. Rev. 1373, at p. 1388.
87
Eric W. Orts, “The Complexity And Legitimacy Of Corporate Law” (Fall, 1993) Washington & Lee Law
Review 50 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1565 (hereinafter Complexity ).
88
R. Clark, “Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties,” in Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business,
55-79 (J. Pratt and R. Zeckhauser eds., 1984) cited in Orts, Complexity, op cit n, 87 p. 1602.
89
Orts op cit, n. 87. This is a summary of Orts extensive arguments on pp. 1587-1612.
90
Ibid, p. 1612
86
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business management studies.92 It is most certainly a right of all members of a society to
participate in such a debate regardless of their material resources. First they have this
right at least to the extent that they live in a democracy. Democracy is based in part on
the view of individual worth and self-expression. Second, humans rarely occupy material
resources for more than eighty years. After that time material resources are passed on,
dispersed, lost, disposed of or simply disintegrate. By way of contrast, the social decision
we make as a society has wide ranging, long-lasting and significant consequences, not
only in our lifetimes but may affect the very future of life on the planet. Finally, the
nature of the discussion must address the public property versus private property debate.
At what point, if any, should control of vast amounts of resources and vast groups of
people be regulated by the public?93 Where such political decisions are being made,
those decisions should be put on the table and openly discussed from these political
decisions, appropriate models are developed, and indeed models are generally
expressions of political decisions.94

6

MODELS 95

91

S. Bainbridge explicitly acknowledges his debate with communitarian corporate legal scholars is
political. Op cit n 4, p. 857.
92
See for example, business scholar, Michael Jensen. Although Jensen has been vocal in his political
leanings in earlier works such as “Between Freedom and Democracy,” (1977) The Banker 39, where he
uncritically advocates certain views as apolitical truth, he seems to have dropped any mention of his views
and presents his later work, although still informed by the same political views as objective management
science. “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function.” (2001)
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.
93
The issue of public and private is addressed considerably in the literature under the rubric
of stakeholder modeling. See also Cox op cit n. 4, G. Mark, “The Personification of the
Business Corporation in American Law.” (1987) 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1441 and J. Gordley,
“The Moral Foundations of Private Law” (2002) 47 Am. J. Juris. 1
94
This is certainly the case in politics even more than in science. See P. Feyerabend’s work on modelling
and theory in his work on the philosophy of science.
95
I have chosen to analyze this debate from the perspective of the Philosophy of Science. It has been
considered in an insightful article by Thomas Joo from the perspective of Cognitive Science and Literary
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Models have an important part to play in understanding,96 whether attempting to
understand oneself,97 one’s community,98 or the universe itself.99 Generally, models are
miniature or simplified representations of structures, systems or processes.100 They
provide insight about how things may work, and provide a platform from which it is
possible to gain deeper insights and make better predictions, projections and suggestions
about how things may work in the future, including very importantly, how modifications
to structures, systems or processes may effect their future working.101 The first,
informative function of models is sometimes described as “descriptive modelling.”102 It
is particularly useful in natural sciences where such models help explain natural
phenomena and permit us to understand causal connections between such phenomena. In
the social sciences, this is the more conservative approach to the scientific endeavour.103

Heuristics in “Corporations Theory and Corporate Governance Law: Contract, Property, and the Role of
Metaphor in Corporations Law” (2002) 35 UC Davis L. Rev. 779. Joo suggests that the corporation as a
nexus of contracts—i.e. the Firm metaphor—is of limited applicability and therefore limited validity in
explicating the nature of the corporation. His recommendation of improving the metaphor by considering
the property aspects of the corporation deserves serious discussion. An alternative view is taken by Paul
Cox who writes “clashing political moralities are imperfectly modeled as a confrontation between
‘communitarianism’ and the neoclassical economic analysis of the firm” in “The Public, The Private and
The Corporation” (1997) 80 Marq. L. Rev. 391, at p. 396.
96
As a curious note, m
odels are not likely exclusive to humans. Psychologist Edward Chace Tolman
studying rat abilities in navigating labyrinths, suggested that they create a “cognitive map” or model in
order to navigate successfully. “Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men” (1948) 55 Psych. Rev. 189-208
97
Models in psychology
98
Models in social sciences
99
Models in physical sciences
100
See section “Model history is culture history” in Dr. Mueller “The Concept of Model and the Quadruple
History of ‘Modulu’”, opening lecture of the 13th International Conference on History and the Philosophy
of Science, Univ. of Zurich, 19-22 Oct., 2000 on Scientific Models: Their Historical and Philosophical
Relevance.
101
See for an extended discussion, M. Morgan and M. Morrison eds. Models as Mediators: Perspectives on
Natural an Social Science (1999).
102
See Braybrooke, chapter “Causal Regularities on the Naturalistic Side” in Philosophy of Social Science,
(1986), pp. 20-46.
103
See D. Braybrooke’s chapters “Three Sides of Social Science” “Settled Social Rules on the Interpretive
Side” in, pp. 1-19 and 47-67 respectively.
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The second predictive function is denominated “prescriptive” modelling.104 This type of
modelling does not provide the strong causal connection found in the physical sciences.
Rather, it provides mere probability in terms of correlational relevance.105 Nevertheless,
it can provide valuable insight and guidance in terms of forward research and broader
guidance.

Modelling, however useful as a heuristic device, like all human endeavour is value laden,
or as discussed by such philosophers of science, as Lacan, “theory-laden.” This
phenomenon—sometimes referred to as the hermeneutical circle106—refers to the
phenomena that one’s understanding is built upon previous understandings, each one
supposedly advancing upon the previous understanding, but obviously, to some extent at
least guided by the presuppositions, and limitations of the underlying theory.107

Model theory is important because of the restrictions and perspectives that models
impose.108 Consider the restrictions models have imposed historically. When one uses a
spiritual model of human beings, illness is the result of demon possession or punishment
for moral or spiritual failing. When one uses a biological models that same illness
becomes a matter of bacterial infection, or chemical imbalance or other disease. A less
104

See Braybrooke on Social Science Interpretive methods.
Advances in correlational sciences have been greatly advanced by progress in statistical theory and
calculation. See for example, W. Salmon, Statistical Explanation and Statistical Relevance, (1970).
106
See for example, the post-Heideggerian hermeneutics tradition as carried on by H. Gadamer, J.
Weinsheimer, and D. Marshall Truth and Method, or furthered in post-Marxian critical thought as
represented in Jurgen Habermas’ work such as Theory of Communicative Action
105

107

Essentially, Feyerabend’s critique of scientific method. See Against Method (1976).
Although model theory was central to the debates of the philosophy of science from L. Wittgenstein
Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1921), R. Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax (1935) the term was
coined by A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Meta-mathematics, (1954/55) and has subsequently formed the

108
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dramatic change of models within a single discipline can have a dramatic outcome. For
example, modelling had a dramatic impact on a formerly fatal illness known as “childbed
fever.”

Women in the nineteenth century who gave birth often died from the associated illness,
“childbed fever.” The Hungarian obstetrician and researcher, Ignaz Semmelweis,
observed that women in the Maternity Hospital in Vienna where he worked had a higher
mortality rate from “childbed fever”109 than other women in neighbouring clinics, or at
home. The model in vogue at the hospital and in the medical community at large
suggested that the fever was the result of stale air. As a result of this model, a concerted
effort was made by the players to avoid exposing new mothers to stale air and air from
the outdoors opened to the women.

Semmelweis began to look at other explanations, however, particularly after a colleague
pathologist Kolletschka, cut himself in the process of an autopsy of a woman who had
died of the illness. The colleague soon succumbed to the same symptoms and was
diagnosed as having died from childbed fever. Semmelweis, the alert researcher,
discarded the stale air model, made the connection between the cut and the illness, which
in addition to radically decreasing the deaths from childbed fever, led to the discovery of
germs. Had Semmelweis been so committed to his model that contradictory information

basis for much subsequent advance in the study and understanding of scientific method. Cited in Mueller
op cit n. 100.
109
See the first hand account in I. Semmelweis, The Etiology, Concept and Prophylaxis of Childbed Fever,
trans. K. Codell Carter in Medicine: A Treasury of Art and Literature 136, A. Carmichael and R. Ratzan ed.
(1991).
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could not interfere, germs would not have been discovered possibly for several
decades.110

As this example illustrates, the theory laden nature of model adopted can have significant
impact on what is found. In particular, how scientists deal with phenomena inconsistent
with the model can be determinative of not only current findings, but also future progress
and the allocation of resources to research programs111 or traditions.112

The problem resulting from model failure is dealt with in science in three manners or
strategies. Where phenomena are observed that cannot be explained by the model, they
can be ignored, used to modify the model, or where the phenomena is too far from the
model’s descriptive or predictive ability, the model can be discarded and a new model
developed.113 When a model is beginning to fail the entrenched defenders of the model,
who continue to control the power and resources of the discipline defend their model at
times viciously against the researchers finding contradicting phenomena which
undermines the model and make efforts to stifle the dissenting researchers’ voices.114 An
interesting example of this is in the case of economist, Tibor Scitovsky, who was
interested in examining and weighing families of preferences. His efforts to do so were

110

Kuhn in his discussion of “normal science” contra Popper’s suggestion that when falsified, a hypothesis
can survive if the secondary premises of the hypothesis is discarded and the principle premise kept. See
Kuhn and Popper in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, eds. Criticism and Growth of Knowledge (1970).
111
Lakatos
112
Laudan, Progress and its Problems (1977), and L. Laudan, “A Problem-Solving Approach to Scientific
Progress”, in I. Hacking (ed.), Scientific Revolutions (1987).
113
T. Kuhn’s seminal work challenging traditional notions of the rational progress of science by model
advancement, sets out a theory based on an analysis of the actual development by a review of historical
scientific discoveries. Kuhn suggests a five phase development of science: 1) immature science, 2) normal
science, 3) crisis, 4) revolution and 5) resolution. In T. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (1972)
114
Kuhn, ibid.
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challenged, research resources were denied and other efforts were made to thwart him.115
Philosophers of science suggest that in fact this is the normal course of scientific research
in which advocates of the current model control the resources, including research
funding, faculty positions, and journals.116 The critical problem arising from this effort to
stifle opposing views, as identified by Feyerabend, is that we cannot know what the
future will discover and count or value as knowledge, and accordingly, following a
dominant model too strictly may retard the advancement of knowledge more than aid
it.117 All knowledge is founded upon cultural assumptions, and these assumptions are
value laden.118 Feyerabend confronted this in a first hand profound manner while
teaching at UC Berkley. He wrote of his experience:
My function was to carry out the educational policies of the State of California
which means I had to teach people what a small group of white intellectuals had
decided was knowledge… In the years 1964ff. Mexicans, Blacks, Indians entered
the university as a result of new educational policies. There they sat, partly
curious, partly disdainful, partly simply confused hoping to get an ‘education’.
What an opportunity for a prophet in search of a following! What an opportunity,
my rationalist friends told me, to contribute to the spreading of reason and the
improvement of mankind! I felt very differently. For it dawned on me that the
intricate arguments and the wonderful stories I had so far told to my more or less
sophisticated audience might just be dreams, reflections of the conceit of a small
group who had succeeded in enslaving everyone else with their ideas. Who was I
to tell these people what and how to think.119

Feyerabend’s insight is stunning, particularly in its blunt, critical and open presentation.
It is a realization that in some ways became a clarion call for much of the academy

115

The Joyless Economy: An inquiry into human satisfaction and consumer dissatisfaction, (1976).
See for example, L. Laudan op cit n. 112, I. Lakatos, “Falsification and the methodology of Scientific
Research Programs” in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge,
(1970), pp. 91-196, discussed in the social science by Pierre Bourdieu, “The Specificity of the Scientific
Field and the Social Conditions of the Progrs of Reason,” (1975) Social Sicnece Information 19-47,
discussed in D. Braybrooke, Philosophy of Social Science, (1985) pp. 77-78.
117
See for example, P. Feyerabend, Against Method, (1975).
118
This is Lakatos idea in his discussion of Theory-laden models.
119
Science in a Free Society (1978).
116
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afterwards as in many disciplines it drifted from stark rationalism into the post-moderism
Feyerabend confronted in this period.

Many economists, like many other scientists, understanding of the role of modelling in
science is at best weak.120 In economics, for example, the extreme views embraced by
Positivists Friedman and Posner demonstrate an incorrect understanding of the nature of
modelling despite its centrality to scientific enquiry.

The Positivist Posner, for example, states “A model can be a useful tool of discovery
even if it is unrealistic… even though its basic premise was false… We should be
pragmatic about theory.”121 Another positivist Friedman writes: “Important and
significant hypotheses will be found to have 'assumptions' that are wildly inaccurate
descriptive representations of reality ....”122 One cannot help but be find it a bit
discomfiting to have major policy issues determined on bases we know to be “wildly
inaccurate.”

The Normative Coase, on the other hand, states, “faced with a choice between a theory
which predicts well but gives us little insight into how the system works and one which

120

See for example, Richard Rorty’s discussion of Nobel Laureate in Physics, Steven Weinberg, in his
“Thomas Kuhn, Rocks and the Laws of Physics” (1997) 6 Common Knowledge 1, reprinted in R. Rorty,
Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 175.
121
R. Posner, “The New Institutional Economics meets law and economics,” (1993), 149 Journal of
Institutional and Theoretical Economics, p. 77.
122
M. Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in Essays in Positive Economics 23 (1985) p.
30.
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gives us this insight but predicts badly, I would choose the latter.”123 He continues, “…a
theory is not like an airline or bus timetable. We are not interested in simply the accuracy
of its predictions. A theory also serves as a base for thinking. It helps us to understand
what is going on.”124 Posner is fundamentally, methodologically wrong. Scientific
theory is not about pragmatism.125 It is about understanding reality,126 about getting it
right.127

While the internecine battling between academics may, with reason, seem trivial to those
outside the academy, the implications of modelling do not stop on the steps of the
academy. Where those competing models have an impact on policy and as a result, on
society and on occasion, even on the planet as a whole, modelling and the scientific
process takes on a gravity that extends well beyond the academy, even to the most remote
corners of the globe.128 Where, for example, a country adopts a particular economics
model, which as noted previously carries its value assumption of “economy above all”,
increased global warming inducing carbon-dioxide emissions which benefit the economy
123

R. Coase, “How Should Economists Choose?”, in Ideas, Their Origins, and Their Consequences, (1988)
p. 64
124
Ibid.
125

Posner’s inability to put together a credible theory of pragmatism or ethics is skillfully demonstrated by
R. Dworkin in the latter’s review of Posner’s works The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory (2000)
and An Affair of State: The Investigation, Impeachment, and Trial of President Clinton (2000). Dworkin’s
critique can be found “Philosophy & Monica Lewinsky” 9 March, 2000 47 (4) New York Review of
Books.
126
This is not an adoption of essentialism. Rather, by reality I mean the generally accepted phenomena
under study by a group of scientists.
127
Interestingly, jurist F. Hallis adopted a similar view of models in “juridical science.” Hallis offered:
"[I]f therefore juristic concepts are not true universals, they are not pure fictions which have not relation to
the true account of the real facts. . . . [I]t is a sufficient answer to those who say that juristic science is not
concerned with the real nature of social facts, but only with what the lawyer makes of them, to point out
that the law has a practical and not a utopian aim." Frederick Hallis, Corporate Personality xvi, xli (1930).
xxxiii, cited in Mark, op cit, n. 93, p. 1470
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Global warming’s effects are being seen, for example, in the isolated communities of the Canadian
Artic. Mush at the North Pole in the NY Times T. Friedman in Alaska.
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are considered the better choice.129 Such is the economic modelling debate,130 of which
corporate modelling is a very important expression.

Wisdom in handling models would like with Wittgenstein’s observation: “Say what you
choose, so long as it does not prevent you from seeing the facts (And when you have seen
them, there is a good deal you will not say.)”
As we have seen, there are various value or “theory-laden” aspects to the model
discussion and these apply no less in law. A fundamental analysis of scholar’s prior
philosophical and political commitments has been conducted by Professor Cox.131 As
Cox puts it:
Resolution of conflicting normative visions through law conceived as a political
process or dialogue, or as the practical wisdom of legal authority is not a
resolution compelled by the norms of our community. Rather, it is a choice of one
tradition over another. That choice is not itself justified by reference to the
tradition chosen; it is merely explained by reference to the chooser's prior
commitment to that tradition.132
These prior commitments address the role of the state, the nature of the individual and the
nature of society.133 Briefly, the issues political and philosophical issues identified by
Cox are threefold: (1) is the state an inefficient Levithan of whom we should be skeptical,
129

G.W. Bush stated USA environmental policy in just these terms. In explaining why he rejected Kyoto
he stated: “I will not accept anything that will harm our economy or hurt our American workers.” “Bush
says Kyoto could harm American economy” March 29, 2001 Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.
While it may be argued that climate change may hurt the economy more than polluting will benefit it,
because of the economic model used by the Bush Administration, the economic harm is apparently not
factored in.
130
In his famous lections on the Industrial Revolution, renowned historian A. Toynbee discussed the
economic modelling debate as “Economic Science, and its antithesis, Socialism”, Lectures on the Industrial
Revolution in England, (1884) reprinted as The Industrial Revolution, (1956) p. 58, cited in J. Cohen,
Revolution in Science, (1985), p. 267.
131
Cox, op cit, n 4.
132
Cox, op cit, n. 4, p. 513.
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or is its role to create and mold a better more humane, more just society? (2) Is the
individual a rational self-interest maximizer, or a social being, such as a social
constructionists suggest,134 bound by the norms of society? And finally, (3) is society a
cooperative measure for the good of all, or is it a mere means for individual to achieve
individual ends and society having no independent existence in and of itself? The debate
so framed becomes one in which the corporation and corporate law become one very
important player in the larger enterprise of the understanding and shaping of human
society and individuals. The debate requires fundamental value judgments concerning,
among other things, the valuing of solidarity135 over efficiency136 or vice-versa, such
things as whose planet the Earth is, and whose interests count, and whose interests will be
ignored.

As previously noted, models are of two types: descriptive and prescriptive. The debate
about models in corporate law has been restricted to the former: it has been a debate
about what model best fits the corporation as we have it today in society. From this
perspective, the contractarians would appear to be correct in their views.137 As
Bainbridge opines:
“A theory is properly judged by its predictive power with respect to the
phenomena it purports to explain, not by whether it is a valid description of an
objective reality. As such, [quoting Friedman] "the relevant question to ask about
the 'assumptions' of a theory is not whether they are descriptively 'realistic,' for

133

The framing of the issues as set in this paragraph is based on Cox’s article, op cit n 4, but in no way does
justice to the careful and very sophisticated analysis offered by Professor Cox.
134
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135
Communitarian or Progressive Corporate law scholars.
136
Contractarian Corporate law scholars.
137
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they never are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the
purpose in hand."138

Furthermore, as previously discussed, given the complexity of the issues, political
inclinations and commitments, entrenched positions and interests, the debate on its own
is unsatisfying and ultimately, an irresolvable debate. The other type of model, the
prescriptive, has some interest and importance in the discussions about law, economics,
society and social policy. Prescriptive models often do become descriptive models as
society takes note of and adapts to or models itself after the prescriptive model.139 In this
context, the questions of “What is the corporation?” is transformed into, and “What
should the corporation become?” come into renewed focus. And it is at this point that the
discussion becomes very interesting and the difference between law and economics
comes into even sharper contrast.

7

TRENDS AND CRITIQUES: STAKEHOLDERS, SHAREHOLDERS, AND
VALUES

In North America up until the 1970’s, the model for the corporation had some social
responsibility aspects. As politics moved in a more conservative direction, however, the
corporate legislation followed.140 The prescriptive model for the corporation following

138

Bainbridge, p. 871.
Heuristic and hermeneutical aspects of the model have been discussed above.
140
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the neo-classical141 economists’ advice was adjusted to a more profit directed orientation.
This prescription has been to increase corporate focus on wealth generation even to the
exclusion of all other concerns. This view has been most directly advocated by one of
the previously mentioned founders of the Chicago School, Milton Friedman. In his
famous dictum quoted previously the role of corporate managers is “to make as much
money for their stockholders as possible”142 and that to propose social responsibility for
corporation would “thoroughly undermine the very foundations of our free society.”143
Friedman and other profit maximization theorists,144 however, recognize that wealth is
not an end in itself. Rather, it is an intermediate end.145 Accordingly, these economists
make social welfare the ultimate justification for the exclusive focus of corporations on
profit. In other words, the good end—social benefit—will be achieved by ignoring it and
in fact focusing exclusively on another end—shareholder wealth maximization.146

In the law and economics field, Posner, Epstein and others have advocated wealth
maximization as the organizing principal for law and have encouraged legislative and
judicial reforms to implement this principal. Following Friedman, the shareholder
primacy model as expressed by contractarians has become the dominant model of the

141

I use the term “neo-classical” to denote economic theory that favours rational choice theory, free
markets, and monetary control of the economy. Economists who hold those values tend to be neo-liberal in
political leanings, and so are at times referred to as neo-liberal economists.
142
“The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits,” Sept. 13, 1970, New York Times
Magazine at 32-33, 122, 124, 126.,
143
Ibid.
144
See for example, Jensen, p. 302 “value maximization is an important one because it leads… to the
maximisation of social welfare.”
145
Acknowledged even by Posner, The Economics of Justice, (1981) p. 108and discussed in more detail in
Cunningham, op cit, n. 58, p. 164.
146
This position shows either a remarkable quasi-religious faith in free market economics or a Zen
approach to social justice. For a discussion of foundations of the stakeholder-shareholder debate see my
“Scrooge, the Reluctant Shareholder: Theoretical Problems in the Shareholder-Stakeholder Debate”
(Forthcoming) 12 U. Miami Bus. L.R.
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corporation in corporate law. If economics is indeed a science, as it claims to be, then it
must be acknowledged that an unshakable faith in a model is a religious position rather
than a scientific one.147 Science and the scientist must deal with their models in light of
the evidence rather than the reverse: dealing with the evidence in light of the model.148 It
should be asked, therefore, whether in fact the evidence demonstrates that following the
neo-liberal, shareholder primacy model has increased social wealth.

The evidence is in and this model, particularly as applied in corporate law as the
shareholder primacy/contractarian model, does not make for a better society.149 It can
hardly be argued that positive economics at least in its neo-liberal form have been
successful in creating a wealthier or more just society.

The proposition that increasing shareholder wealth benefits all of society seems highly
suspect in economic studies. For example, in the USA, as corporations have lost broader
societal focus and increased shareholder primacy, one finds a growing disparity between
rich and poor and decline in the wealth of the middle class.150 The figures indicate a

147

John Kenneth Galbraith views the changes in his opinion in this light. Stephen P. Dunn, “The Origins of
the Galbraithian System: J.K. Galbraith” interview with J.K. Galbraith, 2001.10 Division of Economics at
Staffordshire University Business School. www.staffs.ac.uk/schools/business/ economics/papers/ec200110.pdf
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This is indeed Coase’s point in the discussion above.
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See for example, the summary of statistics of poverty and homelessness in the United States in
“Change The Channel” by Bob Herbert, December 19, 2003 NY Times.
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See for example, David Cay Johnston who reports “The 400 wealthiest taxpayers accounted for more
than 1 percent of all the income in the United States in the year 2000, more than double their share just
eight years earlier,” in “Very Richest's Share of Income Grew Even Bigger, Data Show” New York Times
article, June 26, 2003. Clearly, there are many reasons for such disparities such as government policies,
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noted parallels the shift away from stakeholder thinking and seems to suggest that shareholder primacy
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growing disparity between rich and poor and a monopolization of power associated with
riches. Indeed, World Bank and IMF economists151 whose structural adjustment
programs, an integral part of which have been to open borders to transnational
shareholder primacy corporations, have been a failure born on the backs of the poor.152
The question, of course, is who is responsible for the distribution of goods in society in
the first place. It cannot be assumed that a consensus exists concerning the equitable
distribution of goods. Some will argue that the distribution of resources is irrelevant to
the organization of society. Others will argue that a just society requires consideration
and some adjustment of the distribution of society’s benefits.153 Yet others, following
Coase’s work, argue that absent transaction costs, the initial allocation of social benefits
is immaterial. Parties will allocate goods to their most efficient use if permitted the
opportunity to do so. If, however, we accept that society is for mutual benefit, and that
neo-classical economics advocates the contractarian, shareholder primacy model for its
stated purpose of improving social wealth, then we have the appropriate criteria to make
a judgment. That judgment would appear to be, in summary, say that the overall benefits
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W. Easterly, “The effect of IMF and World Bank programs on poverty” (2000) available on IMF
website http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2000/00-00/e.pdf See also Noble Prize Laureate and
former chief economist at the World Bank Joseph Stiglitz’ book, Globalization and Its Discontents, (2001)
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152
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supposed to come from this neo-liberal economic model and its prescriptive corporate
law model of shareholder primacy have simply not appeared.

Accordingly, for legal scholars to adhere to this model—the contractarian corporation—
is an abdication of professional responsibility. Lawyers and legal scholars must be
concerned with issues of ethics and justice. It is not sufficient to take Chancellor William
Allen’s previously mentioned observation that the contractarian model of the corporation
is “the dominant legal academic view” and end the discussion. Describing what is cannot
be the same as saying what should be.

The argument for shareholder primacy is essentially an ethical argument from
utilitarianism.154 Quite simply, by focusing on the shareholder one produces the greatest
efficiency one maximizes social wealth and hence overall social utility. Interestingly,
Friedman himself recognizes that neither wealth nor efficiency are ultimate values for
society. He wrote: “I would favor a free society even if it were less productive than some
alternative—say a slave society… because my basic value is freedom itself.”155
Accordingly, it is appropriate even from an economist’s perspective to inquire about
values and which values we wish to pursue in society. These economists are correct as
far as they go—that society is for improved material benefit.156 Social contractarians
have made this argument in various forms for centuries.157 Economists, however, fail to
154

See Posner’s acknowledgement of his “wealth maximization” theory as a refinement of ethical
utilitarianism, op cit n 8.
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M. Friedman, n. 49.
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Rawls argues this as his first principle of social organization. Conflicting views are presented in Jared
Diamond, Germs, Guns and Steel: The Fate of Human Society (1996) Norton.
157
Philosophers with highly diverging views have made the Social Contract argument from John Locke and
Jean Jacques Rousseau, to the present day John Rawls.
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go far enough. As Rawls pointed out nearly thirty years ago, the second pillar of the
social contract is justice in economy.158 Economics is not a “value free” science.159

Economics, as some economists readily acknowledge,160 does not hold all the answers
and legal scholars should not be seduced into following that lead too quickly or
unquestioningly.161 As Orts in his compelling analysis of normative corporate law
observes, “Corporate law, like most law, is primarily about the rule-oriented structuring
of social power, and it is specifically about the rules that structure the organization of
economic power.”162 Following Rawls, therefore, a compelling argument can be made
that corporate law should include access to power by non-shareholders.163

As a start, therefore, legal scholars should be developing a model that enhances access to
economic power for more parties. Friedman’s and other neo-liberal economists’ dislike
158

Rawls, p. 4 and discussed in detail, 60-75, and 90-95.
Indeed, there is no such thing as “value free” science, even in the hard sciences and we should not let
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Contract, Property, and the Role of Metaphor in Corporate Law,” (2002) 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev 779 who
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into thinking we can avoid the hard questions of how the law makes its value judgments.” P. 778.
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of intrusions on freedom164 cannot be restricted to preserving freedom for those wealthy
and powerful enough to afford it. Hardly anyone would be willing to see a return to the
pre-suffragette or pre-emancipation USA.165 Yet the current model is just that—a
regressive concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the few under guise of
freedom. As we have seen, it sets the grounds for an increasing amount of wealth and
power in fewer hands—it can hardly be any wonder that wealthy contractarians no longer
engage in the debate about corporate models, justice and wealth distribution.166 As
scholar Stephen Bainbridge observes: “As a matter of intellectual interest, the debate
over the contractual nature of the firm is over…. Those who adhere to the nexus of
contracts model pass those who do not like so many ships in the night.”167

Just as the economists at the World Bank are asking themselves,168 what then is the
alternative model for development loans and government restructuring,169 legal scholars
need to be examining more carefully alternative models for corporations that both
enhance social justice and economic growth.170 Legal scholars should be asking
important questions such as what objective should a new prescriptive model include?
163

See suggestion by W. Wilson Leung “The Inadequacy Of Shareholder Primacy: A Proposed Corporate
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And then, of course, look at developing new models that would more effectively include
those objectives.

Other models that have done somewhat better in terms of achieving better social ends171
are those found in Europe and in particular Germany, and in Japan. The models followed
in those countries have included other interests such as labour and collaborating
companies. While the economists correctly argue that Japan’s model has not made the
most efficient use of economic resources,172 as we have seen, efficiency is not the
measure of all things. Indeed, Japan has been much more successful than America in
keeping the ravages of a severe economic downturn from destroying people and
communities. Unlike America which acquiesced to creating the hobos and communities
hobbled by broken families caused by unemployment as America did in the Great
Depression,173 Japan, whose decade long downturn has been even more severe than the
Great Depression in the USA, has neither of these phenomena in any significant number.

Indeed, in Japan nearly all the economic fluctuations have been borne by shareholders
who have invested excess funds174 as opposed to employees whose life’s work and very
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livelihood are dependent on employment.175 Japan’s legendary low unemployment
figures are a reflection in part of this model.176

8

CORPORATE MODELS FOR THE FUTURE

Regardless of one’s political and philosophical commitments it is evident that
corporations with the concentrations of wealth and resources and as the major source of
employment are the major drivers of the economy, culture and environment.
Accordingly, the importance of decisions about corporate models can hardly be
overstated. Not only will they have considerable bearing on the overall economy but also
on development of societies throughout the world and such incredibly important things
such as global warming. Before considering what models should be considered for the
future, a very modest review of contemporary models and their respective strengths and
weakness may serve as a springboard for our thinking forward, which will be followed by
a brief review of two management scholars’ views of future corporations and the
significance of those ideas for future corporate law development.

a) ANGLO-AMERICAN MODEL
The distinctive aspect of Anglo-American model is its “shareholder primacy.”
Shareholder primacy places the interests of the shareholder above all others, and as we
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Times (Sunday Business Section), Feb. 16, 1992, Section 3, p. 13, cited in Murray Dobbin, The Myth of the
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have seen even to the exclusion of all other interests.177 Other interests which are ignored
include such things as the social costs,178 environmental costs, and employee needs.
Every cost the Anglo-American corporation can avoid, it does avoid in order to return
more money to the shareholders. Every benefit it can appropriate it does without regard
to ensuring “there is enough, and as good left in common for others.”179

i) Benefits of the Anglo-American Model
This model is very attractive to for a number of reasons. First, it is attractive because it is
familiar. Second, it is attractive because it puts a considerable amount of money into the
hands of shareholders in a short amount of time.180 Thirdly, when the economy is
growing well, the share values of these companies increase rapidly.181 Finally, its
advocates claim that it is the most efficient. As noted, however, each model has not only
strengths but also particular weaknesses.

ii) Weaknesses of the Anglo-American Model
One problem of the Anglo-American model is that it causes a short-term focus. The
corporation’s executive are more concerned about quarterly results and daily stock prices
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than the long term viability of the corporation. Not only may this short term executive
focus be tied to corporate scandals,182 it also causes serious under-investment in capital
expenditures that in turn undermine the long-term viability of the corporation.183 Such
companies are vulnerable to becoming outmoded and to collapse, which in turn causes
serious economic and social consequences.184 Most Anglo societies are able to deal with
such collapses including corporate funded pension collapses, because their economies are
sufficiently robust and they have adequate social security systems; however, given the
demographic changes and changes in fiscal policy, the strength and durability of such
programs is questionable.185

Another problem with the Anglo-American model becomes evident when there is an
economic downturn. As the world’s foremost management professor Peter Drucker
observed: “It is a fair weather model that works well only in times of prosperity.”186 In
an economic downturn, Anglo-American corporations lay-off promptly their employees
and as a result, in a recession many people are out of work.187 This approach to
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economic downturns is not too damaging to the employees or to the economy, again
because of the social security system.

Anglo-American governments have strong social security systems to help employees
without jobs continue to pay mortgages other living expenses and other costs. This
ability of laid-off employees to continue their basic consumption habits is critical to the
Anglo-American economies because of their reliance on consumers. The USA economy,
for example, relies on consumers for two-thirds of its size and a great part of its activity.

Another problem arises from the Anglo-American model’s ignoring other interests, or
externalizing. Interests such as environment, social problems and employees have a cost
which cannot be avoided. Although not taken into consideration by the Anglo-American
model these costs must be paid in one way or another.188 The Anglo-American way of
addressing these costs is through its very expensive. The GDP contribution of legal
services to the USA economy is significant.189

The costs of dealing with these externalized costs through the legal system are
astronomical. The American economy and American corporations struggle under the
burden of legal costs190 to the extent that nearly every legal reform program looks at ways
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of making the system less costly.191 Not only is it very expensive, but it is questionable
how efficient the system is in either paying externalized costs or preventing them in the
first place. Indeed, it could be argued that many Anglo-American corporations operate
with a “deferred costs” approach where corporations and corporate executives create
costs— social, environment and other costs—with the hope that they will not be
discovered and enforced through the legal system until they have taken their profits and
the shareholders have taken their profits. Such cases include the examples of the asbestos
lawsuits that bankrupted the Johns Mansville Corporation192 and the recently launched
employee suits for exposure to toxic chemicals while working in IBM chip
manufacturing facilities,193 as well as the actions behind the collapses of Enron,
Worldcom and Tyco among too many others.

In addition, it is important to note that the Anglo-American exclusion of other
“stakeholder” interests has led to considerable anti-corporate backlash which in part is
behind the WTO and other anti-globalization protests.194 Anglo-American corporations
191

S. Datta and J. Nugent have shown that for every increase of 1% in the number of lawyers in a society,
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are being forced by the Corporate Social Responsibility movement to expand their
horizons and to spend money to include other concerns. The societies living with this
model see the corporation as a destructive force in society which must be subject to a
high level of regulation and control.195

Unlike enterprises in most other parts of the world,196 Anglo-American model of the
corporation has traditionally been a collection of unrelated strangers who invest money
together. It is run by a board of directors who represent only the interests of shareholders
and management. One of the on-going problems for participants in this model is the
constant effort to keep parties working together.197 Each party focuses exclusively on
and fights for self-interest above all else. It is an antagonistic, expensive model to
manage. Indeed, much research has focused on minimizing the effects of the “agency
problem”—the problem when investors and management are distant from each other and
pursuing separate, different interests.198 Further, this animus is in part what drives the
very expensive and questionably beneficial market for corporate control.199
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iii) Implications of the Anglo-American model for Societies
There are a number of particular and significant implications that can be drawn from the
Anglo-American model poses. This model may not be well suited to economies that are
not robust. A large corporate collapse in a weaker economy can be expected to have
significant percussion throughout the economy and have significant social costs.
Furthermore, some societies, workers do not have the benefit of a social security system.
As a result, when the average worker in such a society loses a job, it is a crisis.
Furthermore, if there is an economic downturn and workers do not have income to
continue to spend, such an economy will have greater difficulty reviving. It simply will
lack the consumption necessary to keep the economy prosperous. Accordingly, the
Anglo-American model which cuts jobs rapidly and drastically in an economic downturn
is not well suited to many other economies, including possibly the United States of the
future.200

In its essence, the shareholder primacy model reflects American values: neo-classical
economics and neo-liberal values.201 There are important consequences which flow from
this American value, including increased wealth concentration, higher levels of
unemployment, and some of the problems with corporate governance are exaggerated.
Given some of the problems of the Anglo-American model discussed, it is clear that there
may be benefits to considering what other models may be available.

Mark Walker, “On the shareholder wealth maximization objective of corporate governance: The case of
leveraged recapitalizations,” (1996) 22(4) Managerial Finance 53.
200
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b) GERMAN MODEL
One of the European models which may offer some interesting alternatives is the German
model. The German corporation is structured with a two tiered or “dual model” Board of
Directors.202 The executive board or “Vorstand” are management. The supervisory
board, “Aufsichtsrat” is a split board with one section of the board of directors made up
of shareholder nominated directors, and the other section of the board, being made up of
employee nominated directors.203 It is interesting to note that in contrast to the AngloAmerican model in which all directors are nominated by the shareholders and are
professional managers, the directors nominated by German workers are there to represent
them, and although usually professionally trained as economists or business scholars,
they are not managers.204 This peculiar board structure is limited in its application to
corporations which have more than two thousand employees—the
“Mitbestimmungsgestz.” Perhaps most interesting is that the operative executive board
“Vorstand” is answerable not to the shareholders, but to the “Aufsichtsrat” or
participatory supervisory board.

German corporations often invest money in training the worker nominated directors to
help them become more effective in their roles as directors. This management training
helps worker nominated directors to understand the management problems faced by the
201
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particular corporation. By investing in this training, the German corporations are able to
get the maximum benefit from the worker nominated directors, and the workers are more
effective in communicating management concerns to workers and worker concerns to
management. These directors work to protect workers’ rights and interests.

Finally, German corporations tend to be financed by banks—that is, banks tend to be the
major shareholders and indeed have accounted for some 90% of all external corporate
finance.205 This shareholding pattern will be seen to have significant effects in the
management of economic downturns.

i) Benefits of the German Model
Germany benefits from this model in two important strategic ways. First, there is less
labour unrest. Unlike the Anglo-American model where parties are fighting against each
other else in pursuit of their own self-interests, the German model functions better
because it aligns management and worker interests in the larger, overall goal of
advancing the corporation. Indeed, although German executive see problems with the
boards, they would not wish to change it.206

The second advantage is that it puts the workers in direct touch with the management
solving at least in part, two fundamental management problems—communication and
trust.207 Management can understand worker complaints, concerns and suggestions more
directly and easily. Workers sometimes have significant contributions to make to
205
206
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management of the corporation because of their very different perspective and hands-on
experience with operations.

German corporations, given their ability to coordinate more interests have more parties
interested in the corporation’s survival. As a result, they tend to keep their investments in
capital equipment up-to-date, and have more secure long term outlooks.208 German
companies tend to have longer strategic visions, less collapses, and are still very
appealing to investors.209

Traditionally, German corporations are family businesses.210 The structure discussed
reflects these family values and it seems to work well for those families. By including
many more concerns German corporations have been highly successful not only in
producing top quality products, but they have been able to do so competitively.

ii) Drawbacks of the German
Effective use of this model requires an egalitarian view of humanity. Whether presidents
of companies or workers on the factory floor, the view must be that humans are valuable,
intelligent and willing contributors to overall group achievement. Furthermore,
management needs to have a confidence that workers have the intelligence and goodwill
to contribute. Finally, the model requires a level of sophistication among workers.

207
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c) JAPANESE MODEL
Another corporate model which should be of interest is the Japanese model. Japanese
corporate law and practice is an interesting mix of German, traditional Japanese, and
American law.211 In some ways, Japanese corporate law has drawn the best of each of
the systems. It is important to note that although Japanese corporate law was established
in 1950 by the occupying USA forces in practice it has developed differently.212 To
create corporate law the USA basically translated and planted the Model Business
Corporations Act into the Japanese legal system. Thus, although at a legal level Japan has
essentially American corporate law, Japanese corporations have largely ignored the law
and operated their corporations on the basis of extra-legal norms.213 Since it is these
norms have driven corporate development in Japan more than the law, the relevant
discussion focuses on the model set out by the norm rather than the law.

The Japanese model has rejected Anglo-American model “shareholder primacy.” In fact,
in the Japanese model, shareholders interests are among the least important of the
interests to be considered.214 Japanese priorities are: the corporation itself, customers,
employees, creditors and finally, shareholders.215
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The Japanese model is based on the village system where everyone worked together for
common survival and the common good.216 Accordingly, as noted, Japanese executives
have given a higher priority to employees’ interests than to shareholder interests. One
example of that priority is the Japanese corporate policy lifetime employment.217 While
it is changing, it is interesting to note how the Japanese corporation has survived in very
difficult economic times. This priority has created significant benefits for Japanese
society.

i) Benefits of the Japanese Model
What is particularly interesting about the Japanese modeled corporation is how it has
buffered society from economic crisis, addresses the interests excluded by the AngloAmerican model and still has had great success in attracting foreign investment. It is
particularly interesting because Japan has experienced one of the most severe economic
declines in the history of the world with its society relatively in tact.

Japan’s economy has been in recession, if not depression, for over ten years.218 The
Japanese economy has shrunk more in the last ten years than the American economy did
in the Great Depression of the 1930’s.219 Despite this economic decline, the average
Japanese worker has been able to go on without experiencing the frightening, devastating
216
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loss of employment. People still have jobs, there is no threat of rebellion, consumers can
still buy and the economy continues to work because of its consumers even though it
continues to suffer severe problems.220

By way of contrast, in the Great Depression of the 1930’s, American society suffered
greatly, its workers had no money to spend and vast multitudes were reduced to utter
poverty. Unlike the Anglo-American model which passed the costs of the economic
decline directly onto the employees, the Japanese corporate model passes the costs of the
decline to the shareholders and institutional lenders.221
A further benefit may be its efficiency—opinion is quite varied on efficiency, depending
on how one looks at it, as will be discussed below. The one area of efficiency is in the
access that shareholders and institutional investors have to information about corporate
performance. They have much better and more direct access, and interestingly, studies
show that they act to remove inefficient managers at least as quickly as European and
USA counterparts.222 Another area of efficiency is in the very limited market for
corporate control, which while supposed to improve market efficiency, is notoriously
expensive, and of questionable long-term value.223 In Japan, it is nearly non-existent.
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ii) Drawbacks of the Japanese Model
The main problem with the Japanese model is that the support provided by the collectivist
approach makes it difficult to deal effectively with underperforming assets.224 Japanese
corporate restructurings do not cut costs, or change much in the corporation other than
the management team.225 Japanese corporations tend to hold onto their cash instead of
reinvesting it into the economy.226 Furthermore, although not a corporate law problem,
the Japanese system tends to burden suppliers and entrepreneurs with the debts of failed
businesses.227 In summary, the argument is that Japanese corporations do not have the
same level of efficiency in other areas.228

iii) Implications of the Japanese Model for the Future
The Japanese model offers some very attractive alternatives for keeping an economy and
society functioning during difficult economic times. Even more appealingly, the model
does so without undue stress on the government treasury. Many governments are not
wealthy and have difficulty meeting even their basic social security obligations.

9

VISIONS OF THE FUTURE
a) Peter Drucker
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Peter Drucker arguably the world’s foremost management theorist, suggests in his
provocative article, “Will the Corporation Survive? Yes, but not as we know it” that in
the foreseeable future there will be some profound changes to the corporation. Drucker
opines that the corporation will increasingly rely on a few professional managers whose
power will increase exponentially. The majority of the work will be out-sourced to
tightly controlled suppliers. This “dispersed model” of the corporation poses huge
challenges for the legal and financial system, not to mention society as a whole. The
“dispersed model” with its higher concentration of power and corollary lower level of
participation exponentially increases the risks of managerial abuse of power, both in
terms of financial malfeasance, and politically.

Drucker notes that this “dispersed model” is not completely new and has precedents
elsewhere. What is new, however, is the context in which it occurs—a loose nonaffiliated corporate culture. This dispersed model also has parallels in multinational
corporations. They regulatory issues229 raised by multi-nationals may ultimately prove to
be insurmountable.230 Nevertheless, the multi-national and the regulatory problems they
pose appear to be here to stay, and if Drucker is correct, we may see more of the same
type of problem in the domestic market. Future legal developments must take this into
account and should be forward looking anticipating some of the issues this will raise. Of
course, law is a backwards looking enterprise examining previous cases and old
doctrines. This orientation makes the future doubly challenging.
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b) Michael Jensen
Another important business thinker, Michael Jensen, wrote an even more radical article
entitled, “Eclipse of the Public Corporation”231 about the future of corporations. While
Jensen’s predictions have turned out to be nearly completely incorrect—his hypothesis of
a dramatic increase of leverage buy-outs has not panned out—his article bears merit in
that it points out the possibilities for a similar concentration of power, although Jensen
observed that the bought-out corporations were usually returned to the public market
within a few years. If such power is available for an extended time in the marketplace,
what risks does it create for the economy in terms of creating monopolies of power,
further corruption of government by special interest groups, and concentration of wealth
and resources.232 These are important issues given the social wealth justification for the
shareholder primacy model corporation on the one hand and the increasing skewed
distribution of society’s resources through concentrations on the other. In any event, law
has considerable ground to cover both in theory and in its development even to reach
today, and increasingly central to law’s mandate is the issue of corporate modeling and
control.

10 CONCLUSION
Each of the models of the corporation is informed by and heavily dependent upon values.
It is imperative that the values incorporated in each of the models be put forth and made
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the center of the debate.233 To fail to do so is to permit the incomplete work of the
positivist neo-classical economist to create a normative vision for society. It permits the
considerations of wealth to determine the path of humankind. A wealth focus offers no
justice, no hope and ultimately undermines our humanity. As long as humans hold
anything other than wealth maximization dear, the need to permit law, indeed to incite
law, to include other values and form society must exist and the value of economic
analysis kept in its place.
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